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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondents (hereafter Employer) do not disagree with the Statement of the Case set 
forth in Appellant's (hereafter Claimant) Opening Brief. 
II. ISSUE 
Whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's finding 
that Claimant's automobile accident injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her 
employment. 
III. ARGUMENT 
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The determination of whether a particular injury arose out of and m the course of 
employment is a question of fact for the Commission. See Neufeld v. Browning Ferris Industries, 
109 Idaho 899, 902, 712 P.2d 600, 603 (1985). 
This Court succinctly summarized the appellate standard of review as follows: 
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, this Court exercises free review over 
the Commission's legal conclusions. When doing so, this Court "must liberally 
construe the provisions of the worker's compensation law in favor of the 
employee, in order to serve the humane purposes for which the law was 
promulgated." However, we limit our review to determining whether the 
Commission correctly denied benefits after it applied the law to the relevant facts. 
Id. The Commission's findings of fact will not be disturbed so long as they are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Substantial and competent 
evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion." The Commission's findings regarding the weight and credibility of 
the evidence will not be disturbed so long as they are not clearly erroneous. This 
Court does not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a 
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different conclusion from the evidence presented. Rather, we must view all facts 
and inferences in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the 
Commission. 
Clark's v. Shari's Management Corp., 155 Idaho 576, 579, 314 P.3d 631, 634 (2013) (internal 
cites omitted). 
This Court further stated: 
[t]he substantial evidence rule is said to be a middle position which precludes a de 
novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes beyond 
the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity. 
Such a review requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the 
agency's determination, though something less than the weight of the evidence. 
Put simply ... the substantial [competent] evidence rule requires a court to 
determine whether the agency's findings of fact are reasonable. 
Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) 
(internal cites omitted). 
1. The fact that there was an intervening, independent cause of in.iury is relevant 
evidence which reasonable minds might accept to support the conclusion that 
Claimant's automobile accident injuries were not the result of an accident arising 
out of and in the course of her employment 
To be compensable under Idaho law, an injury must be the result of an accident arising 
out of and in the course of employment. Idaho Code Section 72-102(18)(a). An injury is 
received in the course of employment when it comes while Claimant is doing the duty which she 
is employed to perform. See Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 6, 235 P.2d 736, 738-39 
(1951 ). It arises out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon 
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which 
the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. See id. 
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Claimant invites this Court to greatly expand the circumstances under which an injury 
will be covered by encouraging adoption of the compensable consequence doctrine, set forth in 
Professor Larson's treatise, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law: 
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original 
injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural 
result of a compensable primary injury. 
1 Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 10.0 I (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 
2014). 
Apparently in an effort to address those situations (such as this case) in which a second 
injury clearly did not arise out of and in the course of employment, Professor Larson created a 
concept which he called "quasi-course of employment": 
[ s ]ince in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we are concerned 
with are in the course of employment, it becomes necessary to contrive a new 
concept, which we may for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By 
this expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee following upon his 
or her injury which, although they take place outside the time and space limits of 
the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for the usual 
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are 
necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for the 
compensable iajury. 
Id. at§ 10.05. 
In circumstances such as those presented by this case, neither the Industrial Commission 
nor the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho has formally adopted Professor Larson's 
compensable consequence doctrine, or his "quasi-course of employment" theory. 
This Court previously rejected the notion that an automobile accident occurring while 
claimant was traveling to or from medical treatment would be a loss covered under the workers' 
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compensation laws of this state. See Kiger v. The Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 
208 (1963). In Kiger, the claimant was injured in an automobile accident while driving to her 
doctor's office for treatment of her industrial injury. In denying her benefits, the Kiger Court 
quoted from the Oklahoma decision of Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper, 147 Ok!. 29. 294 P. 108 
( 1930), stating the automobile accident "was in no sense due to the employment, nor did it result 
from a risk reasonably incident to the employment and there is a severance rather than a causal 
connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be performed and the 
resulting injury." Kiger, 85 Idaho at 430. 
The Kiger Court referred to a previous decision in which it reiterated, "that if there 
occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an intervening, independent, responsible, and 
culminating cause, the latter occurrence becomes the proximate cause." Id. (citing Linder v. City 
of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943)). 
The Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho has never applied the compensable 
consequences doctrine to circumstances (such as this) in which there is an intervening cause 
between the initial injury and the latter injury. The Commission has only done so in 
circumstances in which the second injury is directly and causally tied to the initial compensable 
mJury. 
For example, in Castaneda v. Idaho Home Health Inc., 1999 IIC 0857, 0862 (July 1999), 
the Commission found the claimant's right elbow epicondylitis resulted from her inability to 
properly use her right arm after she broke her right shoulder in an industrial accident, and was 
therefore compensable. Likewise, in Schafer v. Smith Group International, 2006 IIC 0120 
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(February 2006), the Commission found that an overuse injury of the left arm resulted from 
right-hand carpal tunnel industrial injury and was compensable. In Nelson v. First Interstate 
Bank, 2000 IIC 0914, the Commission found the overuse syndrome in claimant's right shoulder 
to be the result of compensable left shoulder injury. In Quenton, 2003 IIC 0244 (2003) the 
Commission determined that left leg deep thrombosis from inactivity was compensable 
following a compensable right leg injury. In short, when the Industrial Commission has applied 
the compensable consequences doctrine, it has done so in cases in cases in which there was a 
direct causal link between the original industrial injury and the subsequent injury or condition. 
In the present case, there is no direct causal connection between the industrial injury and 
the subsequent injuries suffered in the automobile accident. The nature of the first injury is not 
directly related to the onset of the second injury. To apply the compensable consequence 
doctrine to these facts would greatly expand the scope of compensable injuries under Idaho's 
workers' compensation law. 
Because there was an intervening, independent cause of injury, the Commission properly 
concluded that Claimant's automobile accident injuries were not the result of an accident arising 
out of and in the course of her employment. 
2. Under similar facts, the compensable consequences doctrine is expressly rejected 
in other jurisdictions 
Courts of other jurisdictions, following the reasoning of Kiger and Linder, have denied 
compensation under similar facts. For example, in Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1997), a case which is almost factually identical to the 
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present case, the injured employee was killed in a car accident while returning from a medical 
appointment when her vehicle slid on ice and rolled. As is the case here, the employee: 
• had previously suffered an undisputed workplace injury; 
• was awarded benefits for that injury, including medical benefits; 
• was returning from a medical appointment in connection with treatment and care required 
for the workplace injury; 
• had been required to travel some distance ( out of state) to seek required care, and was 
paid for the travel; 
• was injured while proceeding directly home from her appointment, without evidence of 
diverting on an errand or any other activity unrelated to her appointment; 
• was not driving negligently at the time of the accident. 
See id. at 374-75. 
The Hearing Examiner, apparently following Professor Larson's lead, found that the 
death was compensable because the death could be theoretically linked to the injury. See id. at 
377. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming found that the " ... linkage between the 
compensable injury and the travel is direct and unbroken." Id. at 375. The Court was presented 
with the question of whether the heirs of the employee were entitled to benefits under a 
Wyoming statute which mandated death benefits "if an injured employee dies as a result of a 
work related injury ... [.]" Id. 
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The Court found that the death statute at issue provided broader protections than other 
workplace injuries not resulting in death. The Court wrote, " ... the language 'as a result of' is 
broader than the concept of 'proximate cause[.]' The Legislature chose this language for a 
reason, and that reason must be because death benefits were not intended to be restricted only to 
families of those whose deaths were immediately, solely, primarily, or proximately caused by 
industrial accidents." Id. at 376. 
Even with broader protections, the comi reversed the hearing examiner, finding that in 
order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the direct cause of the employee's 
death. See id. at 377. The court's reasoning is particularly instructive here, and therefore will be 
quoted at length: 
As the division points out, it would be impossible to ever cut off compensability if 
we were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of the causation 
requirement. Would we compensate an employee who wrecked her car and died 
because she fell asleep at the wheel while she was on her way to see her doctor? 
Would we compensate an employee who was killed by a drunk driver while she 
was on her way home from her doctor's appointment? A logical end would not 
exist to the causation test which the hearing examiner proposes. Furthermore, it 
would lead to too many abuses, and the worker's compensation fund would, in 
effect, become a general health and accident insurance fund, a purpose for which 
it was not intended. 
A causal connection does not exist between the employee's initial injury and her 
car accident. The fact that she was returning from a doctor's appointment for an 
injury which she sustained while she was working ... does not translate to a 
finding that the injury caused her death. Certainly, the accident which caused the 
employee's death did not occur because of her work related back injury. The 
accident was not a hazard of her employment that she would not have been 
subjected to apart from her job nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to 
the character of the business. Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that we 
are all equally exposed to - bad road conditions. 
Id. at 377-78 (emphasis added). 
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The Bruhn Court also examined, and expressly rejected, the concept of quasi-course of 
employment; instead, it held that in order for a second injury to be compensable, the original 
compensable injury must be a direct cause of the subsequent injury. See id. at 378. 
Under similar facts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Mackin & Assoc. v. Harris, 672 
A.2d 1110 (Md. 1996), considered and rejected application of compensable consequences. The 
Mackin Court reversed a lower court ruling granting workers' compensation benefits for an 
injury that occurred when claimant slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk while making his way to 
his physical therapist's office for treatment for an industrial injury. In reversing, the court found 
there was insufficient legal nexus between the industrial injury and the slip and fall to warrant 
additional compensation. See ~Mackin, 672 A.2d at 115. 
Claimant encourages the outright adoption of Professor Larson's compensable 
consequences doctrine. Thus, the Mackin Court's lengthy consideration (and criticism) of 
Professor Larson's approach is particularly instructive here, as it examines the limitless 
circumstances in which benefits would be awarded applying the doctrine: 
Professor Larson's approach to causation in consequential injury cases appears to 
rely heavily, if not almost exclusively, on the "but for" test; but for the first injury 
and the need for treatment therefor, would the second accident have occurred? 
The "but for" test has some value in the determination of causation. If a set of 
facts cannot pass the "but for" test, causation in fact is ruled out. The converse is 
not true-if a fact situation passes the "but for" test, the requisite causation is not 
necessarily established. That is so because the literal application of the "but for" 
test may fail to exclude causation links that are metaphysically conceivable but 
practically and legally absurd. But for the fact that the negligence of Driver A in 
blocking an intersection caused Driver B to be delayed two minutes, Driver B 
would not have arrived at a subsequent intersection two miles away when he did, 
and would not have collided with Driver C at that intersection. But for the fact 
that an employee is injured on the job and temporarily disabled, he would not 
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have been at home on a normal work day and would not have fallen down his 
cellar stairs, tripped on a garden hose, etc. These illustrations may pass the "but 
for" test, but causation in any meaningful sense, whether in the context of tort law 
or workers' compensation law, is simply not present. 
This expansive view of causation, which invokes the necessity to "contrive" the 
legal fiction of "quasi-course of employment" or to find implicit conditions of 
employment, leads to rather extraordinary results. Professor Larson suggests, for 
example, that a claimant injured by taking the wrong bottle from his medicine 
cabinet while endeavoring to take aspirin for a compensable injury should be 
entitled to compensation benefits for ingesting the wrong medicine: 
If the employee fault is simple negligence, as in carelessly taking 
bichloride of mercury tablets by mistake for aspirin although the 
bottle was plainly marked 'Poison,' under this test the subsequent 
injury would be compensable, and this seems to be the right result. 
Larson,§ 13.1 l(d). 
Presumably, the expanded concept of causation would also afford compensation if 
the claimant twisted his back while reaching for the medicine, or was injured 
while going to and from a drug store to obtain medicine. In Dept. of Transp. v. 
King, 554 So.2d 1192 (Fla.App.1989), review denied, 563 So.2d 631 (1990), a 
pedestrian injured by a car that jumped a median after colliding with another car 
was awarded compensation benefits because at the time of the accident she was 
taking a walk and had been instructed by her physician to take walks to aid the 
healing of an industrial injury to her leg. In Little Caesar's Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 
So.2d 8 (Fla.App.1990), an off-duty claimant was involved in an automobile 
accident while returning from a park where he had been swimming. He claimed 
compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the automobile accident on the 
ground that his doctor had recommended swimming as an appropriate exercise to 
recover his strength after an earlier work related injury. The court awarded 
compensation benefits, holding that the claimant's injuries were within the chain 
of causation started by the industrial accident. These holdings are not consistent 
with our view of the causal relationship required to support a compensation claim 
for consequential injuries. 
Id. at 1113-14 (emphasis added). 
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Likewise, in Carlson v. Young, 171 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1959), the employee was required 
to submit to a medical examination, and while in route was injured in a bus accident. In 
affirming the lower court's denial of benefits due to injuries caused by the bus accident, the Ohio 
Court of Appeals stated: 
If the intervening cause was wholly responsible for the final result, then no 
liability attaches to the previous injury. To create liability, the disability suffered 
must be the consequence of a continuous chain of causation so connected that the 
act or force complained of is carried through from the employment to the accident 
to the injury and to the disability. If an intervening independent agency breaks 
the chain of causation so as to destroy the original force, the employer is relieved 
from injuries following the termination of the force which the employment set in 
motion. 
Id. at 738-39 (quoting from Scheider on Workmen's Compensation, v. 6, § 543(£), p. 53). (See 
also Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 NW2d 808 (1942); Dean v. 
Chrysler Corp., 434 Mich. 655, 455 NW2d 699 (1990)). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It has been widely observed that "bad facts create bad law." The undersigned asserts that 
a more accurate statement would be "difficult facts create bad law." This case presents just such 
difficult facts Claimant was required to attend an independent medical evaluation some 
distance from her home at a time of year when road hazards were possible, and was injured 
through no fault of her own due to those road hazards while returning from the appointment. R., 
9-11. 
It is difficult under such circumstances not to sympathize with Claimant, and perhaps it is 
tempting to assign the risk of such travel to the Employer. However tempting it might be, 
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Claimant's arguments run contrary to and seek to overrule a valid decision of this Court on point. 
An extreme case such as this is a poor basis for a broad precedent which would cover unlimited 
less extreme circumstances. There is no required legal nexus between Claimant's industrial 
injury and the injuries suffered in the automobile accident. Idaho has not adopted the "quasi-
course of employment rule" suggested by Professor Larson. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Employer and Surety respectfully petition the Court to 
uphold the Commission's finding that Claimant's motor vehicle collision was an intervening, 
independent, responsible, and culminating cause, and therefore the proximate cause of the 
injuries resulting from the collision. Therefore, Claimant must be denied benefits associated 
with those injuries. 
DATED this day of February, 2015. 
MOSMAN L/W OFFICES 
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